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Allied Force Analysis
Strength;
Anglo-French: 2,000,000
Dutch: 400,000
Belgian: 600,000
Combat aircraft: 1,700
Tanks: 3,600
Anglo-French field Armies : 9
Anglo French Divisions:
Infantry – 87 (1,870,000 men)
Armored – 3 (60,000 men)
Fortress – 13 (200,000 men)
Total: 103 Divisons + about 40 Dutch and Belgian Division Equivalents
To compute troop strengths into a force strength it is assumed that each combat aircraft was the equivalent of 100 soldiers, each with his share of supporting weapons (such as mortars, machine guns, and artillery). Thus 1,700 aircraft would have been the equivalent of 170,000 men. Comparisons of the firepower values of the weapons involved reveal that this assumption, while arbitrary, is neither unreasonable nor capricious. Similarly, it is assumed that each Allied tank was worth 50 men and their share of supporting weapons. This means that the 3,600 tanks were the equivalent of 180,000 troops. With the exception of the three armored divisions, the Allies allocated their tanks and planes more or less equally among their divisions and armies.
On the basis of these assumptions about the manpower values of planes and tanks, the force strength of the Allies in thousands of manpower equivalents is 3,350, since there were 9 field armies, each army was about 240,000 manpower equivalents.
German Force Analysis
Manpower: 2,400,000
Combat aircraft: 3,500
Tanks: 2,576
Field armies: 8, plus a panzer group
Divisions:
Infantry: 104 (2,080,000)
Panzer: 10 (200,000)
Mechanized: 9 (180,000)
Total: 123 Divisions.
The Germans allocated their tanks exclusively to panzer and mechanized divisions, and then combined these divisions into one Panzer Group (Kleist), and one panzer corps (Hoth). The Germans did not allocate their airpower to armies, but kept it under centralized control. Applying the same premises as before, German force strengthe totals 2,913 thousands of manpower equivalents. The Germans allocated their forces as follows:
Army Group B (2 Armies plus Panzer Corps plus 30% airpower) = 766
Army Group A (4 Armies plus Panzer Group plus 60% airpower) = 1,712
Army Group C (2 Armies plus 10% airpower) = 595
Variable Factors
There were two factors of principal importance; defensive posture and terrain. Both of these affect the strength of the defender. It was assumed that other variable factors more or less cancelled each other out on the two sides. HERO analyses show that a force in a hasty defensive situation has its force strength multiplied by a factor of 1.3; prepared defense enhances the force strength of a defender by a factor of 1.5; fortified defense has a multiplying effect of 1.6. An average value for a mixture of these postures would be about 1.4.
The multiplying factor in favor of the defender of the flat terrain of the Low Countries is about 1.1. The effect of the mixed terrain of the Ardennes and northeastern France is to increase the defender’s force strength about 1.3 times. In the more rugged areas, like the Vosges Mountains, the terrain factor is about 1.5. Across the entire front, from North Sea to Switzerland, the average terrain factor would be about 1.2 for the defender.
Quality of Troops
Quantification of the quality of the troops is also based on extensive analyses by HERO. The analyses show that in their previous conflict (World War I), the Germans were better in ground combat than the Allies by a factor of about 1.2, in other words, 100 Germans in combat units were roughly equivalent of 120 Allies in combat units. The factor turned out to be almost identical in World War I.
Opposing Forces – Historical
Dutch(400)+Belgians(600) vs Army Group B(766)
Flanders Force(480)
Hinge Force(720) vs Army Group A(1,712)
Maginot Force(1,400) vs Army Group C (595)
Historical Comparison
The Germans, of course, had no intention of making a general attack all along the line. They had amassed a powerful striking force in Army Group A, in the center of their line, and planned to make a penetration through the Ardennes. The German plan and deployment requires an analysis of the battle in three major sectors; (1)Low Countries (2)Ardennes (3)Maginot Line.
Low Countries: Army Group B was to make a holding attack against the Dutch, Belgians, and any Allied forces advancing into Belgium and Holland. It was their intention to make the Allies believe this was their main effort, and that they were initiating a new Schlieffen Plan. The Allies took the bait. Three Allied armies actually moved into Belgium, but only two were in contact very briefly with Army Group B.
Applying the specified criteria, the German Combat Power for Army Group B equals 919, for the Allies the result is 2,279, result being an Allied combat power preponderance of 2.48, stopping the German drive (which in fact happened)
Ardennes: Using the same methodology, the result is a German 2,054 combat power vs an Allied 1,310, the German preponderance of combat power is sufficient to assure a breakthrough (1.57).
Maginot Line: The Germans never had any intention of attempting a bloody, and essentially doomed, assault on the Maginot Line. All they wanted was to demonstrate with sufficient vigor so that they could hold the Allied forces in and behind the fortifications as long as possible. Had they really attempted an attack, the ratio would have been 714 vs 2,912 for a combat power preponderance in favor of the Allies of 4.0, resulting in a German failure.
Hypothetical Comparison
Basically we are going to change the ‘lineup’ as follows:
1 - Dutch(400)+Belgians(600) vs Army Group B (766)
2 - Penetration Force(960) attacks German 1st Army in the right flank of Army Group B (300)
3 - Hinge Force(960) vs Army Group A, except 1st Army, (1,412)
4 - Maginot Force vs Army Group C(595)
Comparing the respective Combat Powers in each of the AOs, we obtain the following ratios:
1,- German 919 vs Allied 1,540 results in German attack stopped by Allied combat power preponderance of 1.68
2.- Allied 960 vs German 608 results in Allied combat power preponderance of 1.58 – clean breakthrough.
3.- German 1,694 vs Allied 1,747 results in the German attack stalling despite their preponderance in numbers and combat effectiveness. The Allies, making use of the terrain and of a mix of hasty and prepared defenses, would not have been overrun as they actually were in 1940.
4.- German 714 vs Allied 915 results in a stalled German drive.
All info Trevor N. Dupuy's "Understanding War"