The Type 00 did extremely well in China, downing 99 enemy planes with no losses of their own (although the aircraft they flew against were woefully obsolescent). Chinese citizens and soldiers weren't the only witnesses to the A6M's deadly efficiency. Generalissimo Chaing Kai Shek, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Military, invited military advisors from the United States and Europe to help modernize China's defenses. These advisors took notice of the Zero fighter and warned their own countries of its existence, though these warnings were largely ignored. No one could believe that such an aircraft could come from a country known for shoddy products.
Claire Lee Chennault was one such advisor. This former colonel had retired from the U.S. Army Air Corp. because his theories on tactics were so at odds with the fiercely conservative Air Corp. brass. He was asked to help modernize the Chinese Air Force, and quickly became friends with Chaing Kai Shek and his lovely wife. The retired colonel wrote a report about the deadly Zero and sent it to the U.S. government. It was promptly filed away. This was a mistake. If the threat had been taken seriously, and if American pilots had been trained to deal with such a fighter, the Japanese would likely have sustained much heavier losses in the early air war.
Soon after the attack the Japanese began a steamroller offensive against the Allies across the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and the rest of the Western Pacific. The A6M led the way; its stunning agility and offensive power decimated all opposition. Indeed the rapid advance across the Pacific was due in most part to the Zero's exceptional dog fighting capabilities. U.S. pilots flying P-40s, P-39s, F4F Wildcats, F2A Buffaloes and P-26 Peashooters found themselves at a disadvantage fighting a numerically superior force of Japanese fighters using antiquated dog fighting tactics. Every time the Americans took a stand they were beaten. The Zero possessed almost mythical agility and seemed to be invincible; the Allied forces in the Western Pacific quickly fell.
The British fared no better than the Americans did. The RAF squadrons stationed in Malaya were flying the American Brewster Buffalo; a short barrel shaped fighter that was outmoded before it reached the front. Aware of its lack of performance the British had banished the fighter to Burma, away from combat with the superior German Bf-109. The general impression was that the Japanese had nothing but outdated biplanes that would not be a match for the Brewster fighter. When the British Buffaloes came in contact with the A6M they were sliced to ribbons.
To reduce their losses the RAF decided to replace the outmatched Buffalo with the more formidable Hawker Hurricane, famed for its decisive role in the Battle of Britain. Unfortunately, its pilots also found that fighting a Zeke on its terms was practically hara-kiri. Finally, the British threw their best at the Japanese, the fabled Supermarine Spitfire. To the Allies dismay, this fighter also could not compare with the incredibly nimble Zero. In only two engagements, Zeros downed 17 of 27 while losing 2 of their own.
It seemed the A6M was an unstoppable juggernaut. It soon gained the reputation of being invincible. Everywhere it was encountered, the Zero vanquished its enemies.
Everywhere with the exception of China, that is. Patrolling the skies over China were a band of American mercenaries known as the AVG (American Volunteer Group). Flying P-40s adorned with fearsome shark's mouths they shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility and almost single-handedly saved China. Amazingly, this ragtag group of renegades, or so their Japanese opponents called them, fought using only fifty or so planes at a time and downed several times that many. They became known to the grateful Chinese populous as "Fei Hu" or Flying Tigers. The keys to their success was understanding their enemy, the tactics they employed, Col. Chennault's uncanny ability to predict the enemy's next move, and an aircraft that excelled in their method of fighting. Much has been written about the AVG, so this article will only briefly summarize the accomplishments of the famed unit.
The AVG was made up of three squadrons, The Adams & Eves, The Panda Bears, and The Hell's Angels. They began combat operations on 20 December 1941 and officially disbanded on 4 July 1942. For seven months this ragtag band of Army, Navy, and Marine pilots were the only effective defense in the skies over China. Once organized, the men of the AVG recorded an unprecedented 70 to 1 kill ratio, 296 (although some sources say 286) enemy aircraft confirmed and an additional 153 probables for a loss of only 12 planes and 3 pilots in air combat. An even more impressive feat considering that the American mercenaries had virtually no combat experience while the Japanese had been fighting in China for years.
The tactics of The Flying Tigers were the key to its astounding record. The early warning net (a primitive yet effective network of spotters and ratio operators set up to report enemy aircraft) would report the position, direction, and estimated altitude of incoming Japanese aircraft. The Flying Tigers would climb above the enemies' altitude on an intercepting course. On sighting the Japanese they would dive on them at high speed and slash through their formation, guns blazing. After the attack the Tigers would use the speed from the dive to exit the combat zone and climb for another pass. It was essentially a drive-by shooting.
A few volunteers were displeased with this tactic and resigned. This method of fighting did not go over well with the Chinese and British flyers in the area, either. Initially, British pilots seen diving away from combat would be court-martialed; Chinese pilots seen doing the same would be shot. However, as the Flying Tigers' success mounted other units adopted their tactics.
"We passed Moresby and the bursting flak fell behind. I sighed with relief. Too soon! Nearly a mile above us, a single P-40 fighter dove with incredible speed. He came down so fast I could not move a muscle; one second he was above us, the next the lone plane plummeted like lightning into the bombers. Six hundred yards in front of me, I watched the fighter- he was going to ram! How that plane ever got through the few yards' clearance between the third and fourth bombers of the left echelon, I shall never know. It seemed impossible, but it happened. With all guns blazing, the P-40 ripped through the bomber formation and poured a river of lead into Miyazaki's plane. Instantly the Zero burst into flames. With tremendous speed the P-40 disappeared far below."
The most important thing to note about the results published in Intelligence Summary No. 85, at least for this study, is that they likely understated the Zero's performance. Intelligence Brief #3 (from which the Summary No. 85 data was taken) states: "It is probable that the airplane in original condition was somewhat faster than is indicated here, due to lack of flush fit at wheel well fairings and cabin enclosure in the overhauled plane, and the addition of non-specular paint." These defects may relate to the 98 percent condition of the airplane mentioned by Admiral Saunders in Reardon's book. However, the test report also reveals a more profound defect in the tests. The Zero was tested at a maximum boost of 35 inches of mercury. The aircraft was operated at 38 inches of mercury for only brief periods because the engine ran rough and there was fear of losing the test aircraft. Thus the aircraft was not tested at its overboost rating (N.B. "overboost" is something of a misnomer, the 38 in. Hg boost was obtained by operating a boost shift lever that allowed and regulated this level of boost). Possibly also significant was the fact that the automatic mixture control was inoperative and the carburetor had to be adjusted manually during the tests. (Additional note: the U.S. notations 35 and 38 in. Hg actually reflect Japanese ratings of +150mm/35.4 in. Hg and +250mm/37.8 in. Hg).
On April 30, 1942, thirteen P-39s from the 35th and 36th Pursuit Squadron flew their first combat mission under Lt Col Boyd D. Wagner. For the next 18 months, the P-39 and the P-40 were the principal front line equipment of USAAF fighter units in the Pacific. They carried much of the load in the initial Allied efforts to stem the rapid Japanese advance. Many Allied pilots lacked adequate training, and equipment and maintenance were below average. The Airacobras operating in the Southwest Pacific were sometimes called upon to serve as interceptors, a role for which they were totally unsuited. They proved to be no match for the Japanese Zero in air-to-air combat. In fact, because of difficulties with the oxygen supply, the Airacobra was not even able to reach the Mitsubishi G4M (code name *Betty*) bombers raiding from altitudes above 25,000 feet.
In the laconic words of the official AAF history: "The Airacobra, even in a good state of repair, was unable to meet the Japanese fighters on equal terms."
Experienced Japanese pilots such as Saburo Sakai regarded the Airacobra as a relatively easy "kill". The P-39s were not as manauverable as the lighter and more nimble Japanese fighters, and enemy fighters could often avoid combat with the P-39s by outclimbing them. Nevertheless, the Airacobra was quite tough and was able to absorbing a great deal of battle damage and still keep on flying, and its armament was able to deliver lethal blows to many a lightly-armored Zero.
Что-то одно. Или верна отражена или кривые.
Many P-39 pilots removed the 4 x .30cal wing guns as they were considered worthless. The weight reduction from the wing guns gave much better responsiveness and agility and improved the P-39's roll rate. Some US pilots even removed the armor from their P-39's preferring the greatly improved manuverability to being slow but a target.
Test No. 1 - Commencing at 17,000 feet:
1. Spitfire and Hap to approach head on and maneuver, without loss of altitude, until one aircraft gets on the other's tail.
Both aircraft passed at about 50 yards. Spitfire executed steep climbing turn. Hap dteep turned and was on Spitfire's tail within 2½ turns.
2. Hap on Spitfire's Tail. Spitfire to complete 4 steep turns to left. Reform position and carry out 4 steep turns to right.
Hap was able to turn easily inside Spitfire. However, jinking was necessary to watch Spitfire and check on deflection allowance. Hap did not steep turn as easily to right as to left.
3. Spitfire on Hap's Tail. Steep turns to left and right as in previous test.
Hap commenced steep turning at 220 mph IAS. Spitfire was unable to turn with Hap., either in left or right hand turns, for more than ¾ turn by which time Spitfire was close to stall.
4. a. Hap on Spitfire's Tail. Spitfire to perform loop.
b. Spitfire on Hap's Tail. Hap to perform loop.
a. Spitfire commenced looping at 300 mph IAS with speed of 140 mph IAS on top. Hap had no trouble in following Spitfire.
b. Hap commenced lop at 220 knots IAS and completed two loops in succession. Spitfire endeavored to follow Hap and stalled at top of first loop and fell out. Hap finished on Spitfire's tail.
5. Hap on Spitfire's tail. Spitfire to shake Hap off.
Spitfire commenced evasive action by executing diving aileron rolls to right. Hap had difficulty in following this maneuver and was unable to get into firing position. Spitfire then did a high speed vertical climbing turn which Hap was just able to follow. Hap was able to comfortably follow all other maneuvers which were not carried out above 250 mph.
1. Hap considerably more maneuverable than Spitfire at low speeds.
2. Hap stalling speeds considerably lower than Spitfire.
3. Hap able to turn and loop in much smaller radius.
4. Hap able to carry out any aerobatic maneuver at a much lower speed than Spitfire, e.g, roll off the top of loop - Hap 205 mph, Spitfire 250 mph.
5. Hap experienced considerable difficulty in following Spitfire in High-G, High-Speed maneuvers, especially to right.
6. At medium and low levels Hap easily able to evade Spitfire abd turn the tables.
1. Do not attempt to dogfight the Hap, especially at low airspeeds.
2. If you have a height advantage, use excess speed obtained in your diving attack to climb vertically thus retaining your height advantage.
3. High Speed - High G tactics will considerably alter the disparity in maneuverability.
4. Keep your speed high. Don't stagger through the sky.
Test No. 2 - Commenced at 27,000 Feet:
The results obtained in Test No. 1 were confirmed and the following additional conclusions were reached.
1. Spitfire had an approximate advantage of 25 mph at 26,000 feet.
2. Spitfire had a slight advantage in rate of climb at 26,000 feet.
3. Spitfire initially gained speed slightly faster in a vertical dive.
4. The Spitfire's advantage in 2 and 3 are not sufficient to evade the Hap's fire.
5. At altitudes over 20,00 feet with a height advantage of approximately 3,000 - 4,000 feet, the Spitfire can dive and attack the Hap with impunity. The breakaway would be made in a vertical climb, thus maintaining height advantage.
Tests No. 3 and 4 - Commenced at 17,000 and 32,000 Feet Respectively:
1. No appreciable differences were noted at 17,000 and 27,000 feet.
2. A special Spitfire was used for these trials.
3. All maneuvers were carried out at high speed and high "G".
Hap commenced tests on Spitfire's tail:
1. In high speed flight, Spitfire was able to loop in a smaller radius. Hap pilot blacked out endeavoring to follow.
2. Spitfire carried 3 loops in succession at high speed and finished in firing position on Hap's tail.
3. Spitfire carried out roll off top of loop. Hap was unable to follow in same radius and lost considerable distance.
4. Spitfire executed a series of high speed, tight diving turns to right; Hap pilot unable to follow and was on verge of graying out.
5. Spitfire executed a ½ roll to right from 45° dive at 280 mph IAS and 330 mph IAS and pulled out abruptly into vertical climb. Hap pilot unable to follow this maneuver either at 280 or 320 mph and finished up in both instances approximately 1000 feet below Spitfire and some distance behind.
1. Spitfire was able to evade and outmaneuver Hap by combining high speed and High "G".
2. Spitfire required a minimum speed of 250 mph to retain maneuverability advantage.
3. Hap was able to evade and outmaneuver Spitfire by maneuvering at low speeds.
4. Stresses placed upon both aircraft during tests were not measured. However, the Hap pilot considers his tolerance in reference to blacking out to be above average.
по вашему, победы а6м не от превосходства техники, а оправданы плохими пилотами п39 и п40
Плохой в смысле неверной.
а победы п39 и п40 не оправданы плохими пилотами а6м (особенно после мидуэя), а объясняются превосходством техники?
Если в том же смысле, что и с 39 и 40, то именно так. У них была неверная, т.е. плохая, подготовка. Другое дело, что матчасть затрудняла правильную подготовку - хотя ЛТХ Зеки тут лишь часть проблем. Что же касается намеков на некое снижение общего уровня подготовки пилотов (налет), то хотелось бы объективного взгляда на это.
Потому как а) очевидно, что части, действовавшие на Н.Г., не участвовали в Мидуэе,
В общем, если ты хочешь сказать, что имевшаяся разница в скорости между P-39/40 и Зекой, это не самая большая проблема японской ИА, то я с тобою соглашусь.
По моему он устарел еще при рождении. И его первоначальные успехи были связаны не с силой самого самолета, а со слабостью противника.
SkyDron, вам P-39D2 не нравится только лишь потому, что ее маневренность, согласно IL2 compare, лучше чем у F6F-3 во всем диапазоне скоростей ..... ?
или у вас есть какие-то другие причины ?
Кривая модель (а это не только вираж) влияет на очень многое. Все это менялось по нескольку раз за время существования Ил-2. Причем менялось глобально.
однобоко как-то получается
Так и было.
Я говорю об одном и том же - успехи и поражения японцев обуславливались тактикой противника, а не используемой им матчастью. Разговор о ЛТХ связан с первоначальными рассуждениями о техническом совершенстве и никак не связан с боевой работой.
вам стоит обратить внимание на проблему распределения кадров, потому, что ударная группировка для пёрл харбора и мидуэя включала просто самых лучших пилотов, а остальные части имели только остатки штата.
Такой проблемы не сущестовало - части, воевавшие в ЮВА, так и воевали там. И за первоначальные успехи, и за последующие неудачи ответственны одни и те же подразделения. А рассказы про "сыновей законных жен" не выдерживают проверки практикой - эти "сыновья" ответственны за самое крупное поражение японского флота и то было первое их серьезное столкновение с американским ВМФ.
то не могу согласится с плохими лтх а6м
У P-36А плохие ЛТХ или нет ?