Британский "Геркулес" в Ираке был сбит ПТРК "Малюткой"!

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автор Exeter

Британский "Геркулес" в Ираке был сбит "Малюткой"!

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Выкладываю любопытную статью из мартовского номера Jane's Missiles and Rockets про применение авиации в Ираке на сегодняшнем этапе.

Всю переводить лень, поэтому на ридной мове вкратце излагаю наиболее интересные вещи:

1) Отмечается значительное увеличение действий тактической авиации США и Великобритании над Ираком. Если в середине 2005 г наносилось в среднем 25 авиационных ударов по повстанцам в месяц, то в декабре - уже 150.

2) Согласно данным военных, с марта 2003 г по начало 2006 г в Ираке было потеряно 46 вертолетов коалиции, причем 26 из них были сбиты огнем с земли, главным образом - ПЗРК.

3) Последним (на момент написания) из ПЗРК "Стрела-2М" был сбит 16 января 2006 г "Апач" к северу от Багдада.

4) У иракских повстанцев весьма много ПЗРК от "Стрелы-2" до "Иглы-1", хотя многие системы, видимо, неисправны. В частности, орудует некая особо опасная повстанческая шайка, возглавляемая бывшим офицером саддамовской разведки Абу Айманом и состоящая из бывших военнослужащих Республиканской Гвардии, имеющая "более дюжины" ПЗРК.

5) Иракские повстанцы стали применять против вертолетов самодельные подпрыгивающие мины, использующие дистанционные радиовзрыватели от зенитных снарядов. Мины взрываются на высоте до 15 м. Пентагон стремится преуменьшить угрозу от этих мин и заявляет, что потерь от них пока не было.

6) В тоже время атаки на самолеты коалиции до сих пор относительно малоэффективны. Были повреждены ПЗРК три транспортных самолета, но единственным сбитым до сих пор был известный SAS-овский "Геркулес" RAF, который был сбит 30 января 2005 г. - согласно военным источником, как выяснилось, ПТУР "Малютка", управляемой по проводам!

7) В то же время иракские повстанцы часто обстреливают из ПЗРК самолеты, взлетающие или садящиеся в Багдадском международном аэропорту. 10 января 2006 г. там был произведен пуск ПЗРК по С-130, перевозившему делегацию американских конгрессменов.

8) Из применяемых ВВС коалиции против иракских повстанцев боеприпасов почти 70 процентов составляет высокоточное оружие. Тем не менее, бывают случаи нанесения ударов по мирному населению, опасность чего увеличивается в последнее время по мере возрастания интенсивности действий авиации и участившейся необходимости действий по районам с застройкой.

9) Промахивается 10-15 процентов боеприпасов с лазерной системой наведения - в основном не по техническим причинам, а из-за плохой разведки или неправильного целеуказания.

10) В основном используются 500 и 2000 фунтовые JDAM. С целью минимизации побочного ущерба процент использования 500 фунтовых JDAM возрастает. С конца 2006 г, как ожидается, начнется применение малогаритных 250-фунтовых SDB.

11) Тем не менее, учитывая растущее число ударов, увеличение гражданских жертв неизбежно. Тактическая авиация - не лучшее оружие для противоповстанческих действий.


Текст:


US forces step up PGM air strikes in Iraq


Ed Blanche

The air war against Iraqi insurgents and jihadist militants and their allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan is escalating, writes Ed Blanche. US aircraft are flying an increasing number of close-air support missions with precision-guided munitions (PGMs) against insurgent forces and assassination missions with missile-armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At the same time, US military and intelligence sources say that the insurgent surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat against US and coalition military helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan is growing.
With little fanfare, the US Air Force (USAF), Army, Navy and Marines have been intensifying their PGM air strikes against insurgents since mid-2005; from an average of 25 a month during that period to around 150 in December 2005. This was partly due to a series of offensive ground operations against insurgent strongholds east of the Euphrates River in recent months. But increasingly the accelerated tempo of air operations is to compensate for a politically driven reduction in US ground forces that is now underway and expected to continue as emergent US-trained Iraqi forces take the primary responsibility for the counter-insurgency campaign.
Military helicopters are the main target for Iraqi insurgents. According to military records, 26 of the 46 helicopters lost in Iraq since May 2003 were shot down by ground fire, mainly MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems) missiles.
The latest example occurred on 16 January, when an AH-64 Apache gunship crashed on a farm near the town of Taji north of Baghdad after apparently being hit by a shoulder-fired, heat-seeking Strela 2M (SA-7 'Grail') during a ground-support mission. Both crewmen were killed. A little-known Islamist group, the Salahu Din al-Ayubi Brigades, claimed responsibility.
The Apache was the third US helicopter lost in 10 days - an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance helicopter went down near the northern city of Mosul on 13 January, killing its two-man crew, and a UH-60 Black Hawk crashed near the flashpoint town of Tal Afar in the northwest on 7 January, killing all 12 people aboard. While the military has not disclosed what caused those crashes, officials believe the Kiowa was hit by hostile fire reported in the area.
As the air war intensifies, so do the risks facing US and coalition aircraft. Brigadier General Edward Sinclair, commander of the US Army's Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, said in January that Iraqi insurgents had added a new weapon to their anti-aircraft arsenal: a 'jumping' improvised explosive device (IED) used against low-flying helicopters. According to Brig Gen Sinclair, the insurgents may be using radio-frequency proximity fuzes extracted from artillery or anti-aircraft shells on these so-called 'aerial IEDs', which shoot up from the ground to a height of around 15 m before exploding under target aircraft.
Brig Gen Sinclair, who headed a shootdown analysis team to study insurgent tactics in 2003, said these weapons had been used against several US helicopters on recognised flight paths. The Pentagon, apparently alarmed at this disclosure, tried to play down the threat from 'aerial IEDS' and stressed that no US aircraft had been shot down by them.
Still, US officials acknowledge that some of the insurgent forces are developing sophisticated and innovative tactics against the coalition forces in Iraq and are especially determined to find countermeasures against helicopters, which they consider particularly dangerous and effective in countering major insurgent operations.
During Saddam Hussein's rule, the Iraqi military acquired thousands of MANPADS, mainly Soviet-era systems ranging from SA-7s to SA-16s, although many are probably now non-operational because of poor maintenance or lack of spares.
According to US military sources, there have been intelligence reports since 2004 that one insurgent group, supposedly trained by the Syrians and named after its alleged leader's nom de guerre, Abu Ayman, possesses more than a dozen SA-7s. (Abu Ayman is said to be a former officer in Saddam's intelligence apparatus whose group comprises former soldiers of the elite Republican Guard and intelligence services.)
Sources say that the group, which operates in North Babil region south of Baghdad, recognises that countering US air power once US ground forces are cut back will be even more important than it is at present because it will become the critical factor in holding Iraqi forces together.
Allied fixed-wing aircraft have also been targeted, with some success. A UK Royal Air Force (RAF) C-130 Hercules transport, configured for Special Forces operations, was shot down north of Baghdad on 30 January 2005, killing all 10 personnel aboard. A board of inquiry report in December 2005 deleted all reference to what caused the shootdown. The redacted version of the report seems to suggest that the aircraft was shot down by light anti-aircraft artillery, but military sources in Baghdad said it was hit by a Russian-made Malyutka (AT-3 'Sagger') wire-guided anti-tank missile.
Aircraft using Baghdad International Airport, a major US base, often come under missile fire during landing and take-off, when they are at their most vulnerable. A US Congressman, Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii, reported a near miss by a SAM missile fired at a US Air National Guard C-130 carrying a Congressional delegation north of Baghdad on 10 January. According to a report in the Honolulu Advertiser, the incident occurred at night. The aircraft's crew detected a missile, fired countermeasure flares and flew defensive manoeuvres.
A US C-130 was hit by a SAM in November 2003, and at least two other transport aircraft had been hit while operating in the area, but all survived. The RAF Hercules remains the only fatality to date.
As the Iraqi insurgency moves towards its fourth year, the conflict shows no signs of abating. While the Pentagon says little about the air campaign, military sources say US air power in Iraq, with its array of PGMs and possibly with more advanced systems now under development, may well be reinforced even as ground forces are withdrawn, pointing to an increased use of PGMs.
The bulk of combat missions in Iraq are carried out by USAF F-16 Fighting Falcons and F-15 Eagles from the main US air base at Balad north of Baghdad and bases outside Iraq; US Navy F-14D Tomcats and F/A-18s from carriers in the Persian Gulf; and US Marine Corps (USMC) F/A-18s deployed at Al Asad air base in western Anbar province. RAF GR.4 Tornados and GR.7 Harriers also fly bombing missions.
Some idea of the scale of the air campaign can be gauged by a USMC communiqué issued during the siege of the city of Falluja, an insurgent bastion in the 'Sunni Triangle' north and west of Baghdad, in the third quarter of 2004. It said that since the March 2003 invasion, the 3rd Marine Wing alone had expended more than 500,000 lb (227,000 kg) of ordnance.
The USAF says that nearly 70 per cent of all the munitions used by the air component since the start of the operation have been precision guided and that "every possible precaution is taken to protect innocent Iraqi civilians, friendly coalition forces, facilities and infrastructure". However, there have been repeated incidents where these have missed their targets, causing considerable numbers of civilian casualties. Since most air strikes are carried out on heavily populated urban areas, this is not surprising. There has been an increase in the number of reported incidents of this in Iraq in recent weeks, reflecting the mounting intensity of the air campaign.
Pentagon figures indicate that 10-15 per cent of laser-guided munitions do not strike what they are intended to hit. As far as can be determined, this lack of precision is often due in part to the fog of war, imprecise targeting by ground forces or poor intelligence, rather than widespread technical failures. Nevertheless, the increased tempo of the air campaign over recent months has also meant increased risk of bombing errors, particularly in densely populated urban areas where large insurgent groups deploy and are more dispersed.
USAF communiqués on air operations are scanty and rarely specify the weapons used. US aircraft have frequently used 500 lb GBU-38 and 2,000 lb GBU-31 bombs, but recent reports suggest that 500 lb bombs are now more widely used than the larger sizes, and the 250 lb GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) is being prepared for service. The US Central Command is reported to be expecting to receive 3,000 SDBs, and the weapon is due to enter service by the end of 2006.
Given the growing use of air strikes, civilian casualties are inevitable. The growing number of these from air strikes underlines concerns that tactical air power is not the best weapon for counter-insurgency operations.

С уважением, Exeter