РЭБ vs. ПВО США

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Robert Ackerman wrote an article titled ―Iraq Hones Army Electronic Warfare‖
which discussed the US Army‘s electronic warfare countermeasures to the IED threat.
The article starts with the statement that ―the Iraq War has proven to be the mother of
invention for the US Army electronic warfare‖ (Ackerman 2007,61). In response to the
need for electronic countermeasures to the IED threat the Army has committed to
developing a full-scale electronic warfare capability that will be distributed throughout
the entire force. This capability has already achieved a measure of success in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and now is tailoring its effort to interoperate effectively in a joint
environment. The Army stood up an EW (Electronic Warfare) division under the Army
G-3 staff. The Army has placed responsibility for EW integration with fires personnel.
Ackerman argues that early EW efforts against IEDs were based on a brute-force attack
against the entire frequency spectrum as opposed to actions targeted against specific
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threats (Ackerman 2007). These early systems were not designed for crowded urban
environments with rampant civilian radio frequency systems. These systems often
interfered with friendly frequencies, both civilian and military. This interference has
been known to affect satellite, FM, and cell phone systems. Military systems adversely
affected included global positioning systems (GPS) and communication systems. The
communication systems used by Iraq emergency responders, such as Red Crescent
ambulances were also disabled. Newer systems have resolved the interference issues and
can counter IEDs more effectively while maintaining communications. Interoperability
issues with other services EW activities continue to exist.
―Hidden Enemies: Adaptive Foe Thwarts Counter-IED Efforts,‖ by Stew
Magnuson is an article that describes some of these interoperability issues (Magnuson
2006). There have been numerous incidents where commanders must turn off their
jammer to be able to talk on the radio. If a patrol comes under attack, a soldier will open
a gap in the jammer‘s frequency to radio for help. This open gap exposes the unit to
attack by insurgents, who are able to use the gap to detonate an IED. The article
continues to describe a condition it calls ―electronic fratricide,‖ where friendly
communications or jammers cause outages detrimental to coalition forces. The article
states this condition is getting worse, not better. Around the Baghdad area pilots feel like
they are flying with the squelch on because of the static and interference. The article
continues stating that there is such a proliferation of electro-communication devices and
information technology devices in the battle space that control of EW has run away from
the military. As the power and sophistication of jammers increase there is a possibility
that they may actually cause an IED to detonate. While this may seem like a positive
effect, consider an IED detonating on an IED makers bench, which is located in a
residential complex, or a IED detonating while friendly forces are attempting to defuse it.
The insurgents have moved to other methods of triggering IEDs in response to U.S
Forces‘ use of EW. One of these methods is the use of infrared triggers that can be built
from commercial garage door openers and burglar alarms, and do not use a radio signal.
This has been countered by placing a glow plug in an ammo can, and mounting it on a
frame six feet in front of a vehicle. The glow plug creates a heat signature that is
detected by the infrared trigger and detonates the IED, in front of the target vehicle.
In ―Marines Have New Devices, Goals; Cold War Tactics Adapted‖ David Axe
discusses how Marine aviation supports personnel on the ground in Iraq (Axe 2006).
Two-seat Hornet jets were designed to jam enemy radar, but are now being used to jam
radio signals that detonate IEDs. Marine aviators are also trading bombs for updated
targeting pods, called ―Litening,‖ that include TV and infrared cameras, which can help
target bombs or enable aircraft crews to look for insurgents, or even spot them emplacing
IEDs. Jammers that are aircraft mounted have a much larger range than vehicle mounted
jammers. Some of these aircraft mounted jammers can be set to detonate IEDs.
The next counter-IED method this paper will examine is commonly referred to as
route clearance, and is usually the responsibility of the engineers. An article by Yochi
Dreazen titled ―The Bomb Squad,‖ describes a day in the life of a route clearance team
operating in Afghanistan (Dreazen 2009). Marine Sergeant Mario Spencer is responsible
for the team that operates in a Buffalo mine-protected clearance vehicle, named
―Bonecrusher‖ that patrols along Route 515. The article states that last year IED attacks
in Afghanistan increased by 33 percent. The decision to increase troop strength in Afghanistan will increase the use of roads, and an increase in coalition dependence on
route clearance teams. The article discusses how Talaban militants placed 31 IEDs on
the route SGT Spencer patrols over a two weeks period. Two IED attacks killed six
Afghans and wounded two Canadian soldiers. The route clearance team lives in their 13-
foot tall Buffalo, which is built by Force Protection Inc. in South Carolina. The Buffalo
is a type of MRAP. It is their home while they are clearing routes. The windows are
three inches thick. SGT Spencer tells of a patrol in early January, when they were
clearing a route for a convoy of approximately forty vehicles that left Deleram. The
mission was expected to take four days. Route clearance involves moving at a speed of 5
to 10 miles an hour, stopping to examine anything that looks slightly suspicious. On this
patrol they examined a pile of hay, a mound of dirt, and a Ziploc bag filled with white
powder, all proved to be non-threatening. SGT Spencer relates that they never encounter
the militants that plant the IEDs, they would like to catch them so they could insure they
were not able to plant any more. He also discusses how they never really develop a close
relationship with the members of the convoy that they are protecting. One reason may be
that despite the engineer‘s best efforts, IEDs strike the convoy. The members of the
convoy seem to hold SGT Spencer‘s team responsible for their losses (Dreazen 2009).