Pilot error caused bombing deaths at Kuwaiti range

Pilot error caused bombing deaths at Kuwaiti range

2 May 2001

US Central Command officials have determined pilot error was the main cause of the bombing accident at Kuwait's Udairi Range on 12 March. A US Navy F/A-18 Hornet pilot incorrectly identified an observation post as his target and dropped three 500-pound bombs that killed five Americans and a New Zealander and injured 11 others. Six Kuwaiti service members were among the injured.

Immediately after the accident, US Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, CENTCOM commander in chief, appointed US Marine Lt. Gen. Michael P. DeLong to lead an investigation. DeLong's team reported their findings to Franks April 7. Franks accepted the board's findings April 23 with a few minor changes regarding possible punishment of key individuals.

The report identifies pilot error as the main cause of the accident, but with three contributing factors:


The forward air controller airborne pilot used nonstandard terminology when speaking to the pilot on the bombing run.

The ground forward air controller lost situational awareness at a critical point, reducing the time he had to call for an "abort" of the mission.

Conditions at Udairi Range made the observation post and the target difficult to distinguish.
According to the report, the pilot, Cdr. David O. Zimmerman, was required to transmit, "Target in sight; friendlies in sight," before he'd have received a "cleared hot" command freeing him to drop his bombs. He apparently never made that call and released his ordnance before being given the "cleared hot" command, the report states.

Zimmerman told the board he was "deeply saddened" by the accident but declined to be interviewed on the advice of legal counsel, the report stated.

The forward air controller airborne pilot, Navy Lt. Patrick T. Mowles, contributed to the accident by telling Zimmerman, "good nose position," not a standard transmission for this type of mission.

"This resulted in a 'warm fuzzy' (false situational awareness) by the [ground forward air controller] and may have resulted in a 'warm fuzzy' by the incident pilot during his attack," the report states.

The forward air controller airborne radar intercept officer, Navy Lt. Andrea M. Powers, provided information to the board when she was ordered to testify under a grant of immunity, according to the report.

Before releasing his bombs, Zimmerman had asked to have the target illuminated. This allegedly caused the ground forward air controller to turn his attention to the individual on the ground whose job it was to illuminate the target with an infrared pointer. This diversion of his attention delayed his noticing the pilot had targeted the observation post.

When he did notice, he immediately transmitted, "Abort, abort." But the bombs had already been released and exploded seconds later.

After studying the report, Franks left the final decision regarding possible punishment of those involved up to the Central Command component commanders of the individuals. The board's report recommended "appropriate administrative or disciplinary action up to and including nonjudicial punishment" be taken against the pilot and that "appropriate administrative action" be taken against the other two involved.

by Army Sgt. 1st Class Kathleen T. Rhem American Forces Press Service


REF XQQAS XQQMA XQQAR

DSD