France, Russia growing strategic ties

France, Russia growing strategic ties

14 February 2001

Summary

French Defence Minister Alain Richard's recent visit to Moscow confirms French efforts to forge closer ties with Russia. France and Russia have formalised new strategic ties that are to involve much deeper interaction between their military establishments. Surprisingly, France may also gain military capabilities. For Paris, closer military ties are mostly a matter of counterbalancing Germany in European geopolitics.

Analysis

French Defence Minister Alain Richard's visit to Moscow on 17-18 January formalised an extensive and intensive programme of strategic and military-technical collaboration. The defence ministries agreed to hold top-level military exchanges, joint military exercises, military education exchanges, and to increase co-operation in the defence sector.

The French government is going to go significantly further than any other Western country. Germany currently leads Europe in large-scale political, security, economic, financial and investment co-operation with Russia. The agreement between the Russian and French defence ministries will allow France to catch up with Germany in the military and military-technical fields.

Strategic ties between France and Russia are to involve much deeper interaction between their militaries. The visits of their chiefs of general staffs will focus on strategic consultations where both military establishments will discuss enhancing their national interests through geostrategic co-operation.

For France, closer strategic ties with Russia are important to the balance of power in the region. Since the second half the 19th century, France has tried to deter Germany's might on the continent by striking a strategic alliance with Russia. In two world wars, the French and Russians fought together against the Germans.

During the Cold War, Germany was the focus of NATO, while France was relegated to a lesser role. Germany could not afford to toy with Russia, which massed troops in the Eastern half of Germany.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Paris renewed its apprehension at Berlin's influence.

Paris' ability to play an important role in Europe has plummeted since the fall of the Soviet Union. Moreover, France lacks the economic potential to compete with Germany over new European markets.

Developing a partnership with Paris fits neatly with Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategy to cosy up to Europe while undermining NATO's role there. Moscow will also do its best to penetrate the French and Western European arms market through joint production and sales to help revive the Russian economy and defence sector.

Germany is again on the frontier between a united Europe and a diversified group of still unstable post-communist states, including Russia. However, economic absorption of vast territories east of Germany would enrich Berlin's potential, while instability there poses security risks for Germany and Europe.

So far, European economic and political cohesion has come from co-operation between Germany and France. Already Berlin has been pushing Paris aside in controlling the euro and European fiscal policy. If Germany controls access to all new EU members and non-EU partners to the East, then it would magnify its influence economically, politically, and militarily.

Berlin will always be more important for Russia's security, politics and economy than Paris. Still, Paris does what it can to restore its importance in European geopolitics. Since it cannot match German economic influence in Russia, Paris has looked toward increased military ties with Moscow.

The most advanced area of French-Russian co-operation draws from military-technical collaboration. In addition to financial gains from selling jointly modified Russian weapons to third countries, France aims at getting new military capabilities through mastering some Russian advanced weapons systems.

Further growth is expected in the number of joint projects and the level of Russian-French collaboration in military-technical field. According to Nezavisimaya-Gazeta on 17 January, several projects are planned. Moscow and Paris attach special importance to the following three:

First, the French army is keen on buying Russia's Krasnopol' self-propelled artillery system. Its range is up to 40 kilometres, and Russia has worked on extending it to 60 kilometres. The French army wants to have this unique high-precision system for extending its battlefield capabilities. Also, Russia successfully combat-tested the Krasnopol' in Chechnya last spring.

Second, France and Russia want to produce a new version of the MiG-29 air superiority fighter for use as a trainer jet in the French air force and for selling it to Central Europe and North Africa - primarily Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Since it will be a new version of the aircraft, it will complement rather than compete with Germany's EADS partnership with MiG in modernising MiG-29 versions in those countries.

Third, French defence firms will supply avionics for 32 Russian SU-30MKI multi-purpose fighters to sell to India. Israel is also participating in the deal. Paris wants to work further with Moscow on this by extending the contract and marketing new customers.

While the French and Russian governments have similar views on many important international issues, such as opposing American National Missile Defence plans, they have some serious disagreements on ways to resolve other problems, such as Chechnya. Paris will never catch up with Berlin, but that won't keep the French government from trying.


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