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Military Technology MILTECH 11/2003US Armour in Combat: the Iraqi Lessons
This article is a compilation of recently released documents by the US Army Tank Automotive Command (TACOM), Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and other official sources which present a first analysis of the experience of the deployment of heavy armour (M1A1 ABRAMS MBTs and M2A2/ M3A2 BRADLEY IFVs/CFVs) during Operation "Iraqi Freedom". A particular emphasis is placed on sur vivability considerations.
Protection and Survivability
A total of 23 M1A1 ABRAMS and M2/M3 BRADLEYs operated by the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) were penetrated or perforated by either enemy or friendly fire during the 21-day period of combat operations. No ABRAMS crewman was killed or wounded by enemy or friendly fire [four crew-members drowned when their tank plugged from a bridge into the Tigris river - Ed.], while four soldiers were wounded onboard BRADLEYs.
Fifteen of the 23 damaged vehicles (to include nine ABRAMS and six BRADLEYs) were hit by RPG-7s, which thus emerged as the biggest single Iraqi threat to US armoured forces. Two BRADLEYs were hit by three RPG rounds each, and one tank took two RPG hits. There were no catastrophic losses due to Iraqi direct or indirect fire weapons, and no RPG rounds penetrated the ABRAMS' engine compartment or rear grill. In only one case, an Iraqi RPG team scored a "mobility kill" against an ABRAMS. However, nine tanks were destroyed due to secondary effects attributed to enemy weapon systems (some of these cases are illustrated in details in the accompanying pictures). The majority of losses of US AFVs are attributed to mechanical breakdown, and the immobilised vehicles being then either stripped for parts by the US forces themselves, or severely vandalized by Iraqi people.
There are no reported cases of any AGTM ever being fired at any US Army vehicle, and contrary to earlier reports no KORNET missile system has been found in Iraq.
The ABRAMS' frontal turret and hull armour continues to provide excellent crew protection. However, the top, side, and rear armour remains susceptible to penetration. There where documented instances of 25mm AP-DU (friendly fire) and 30mm AP (enemy fire) ammunition disabling a tank from the rear. As a result of this experience, the Army Research Lab developed a special shield for the rear engine grill in a crash programme. General Dynamics Land Systems was then contracted to build the grills at the Lima Army Tank Plant, and the first 20 sets arrived in Iraq to be fitted to both Army and Marines tanks within a week of first receiving the call for help.
The side non-ballistic skirts were repeatedly penetrated by RPG-7 warheads. There were no reported RPG hits on the forward ballistic section of the skirts, nor reported instance of a tank hitting an anti-tank mine. The turret ammunition blast doors worked as designed. There is a documented instance where the turret ready rack compartment was hit, resulting in the main gun rounds being ignited. The blast doors contained the explosion and the crew survived unharmed except for fume inhalation. On the other hand, externally stored items [this is a widespread habit and common procedure for AFV crews during real operations - Ed.] proved to be not only highly vulnerable to small arms fire in themselves, but also a potential liability for the vehicle. In some instances, catastrophic losses resulted from burning EAPU (External Auxiliary Power Unit) material and/or packaged POL (Petrol, Oil and Lubricants) products dripping down into the engine compartment and causing the engine to catch fire.
The fear of the vehicles or their technology being compromised led to the frequent decision to destroy abandoned/immobilised tanks in order to prevent them being captured or inspected by the enemy. These tanks were repeatedly shot by deliberate friendly fire, however they were never catastrophically destroyed except in one instance. It took one termite grenade in the crew compartment, one APFSDS round in the turret ammunition compartment, and two MAVERICK missiles to finally destroy the tank.
Firepower and Target Acquisition
Overall, very few kinetic energy APFSDS rounds were used (although these produced devastating effects when used), this being mostly a result of the low and sporadic level of organised Iraqi armour resistance. Rather, chemical energy HEAT and MPAT ended up being the preferred main gun rounds, in that they are also effective against buildings and bunkers.
Machine guns were the weapon of choice in numerous engagements. This was both because a combat environment with an abundance of soft targets, and because Iraqi antitank teams hid in fighting positions until the US tanks were very near before attacking them, thus negating the use of the main gun.
First generation thermal imaging sights worked as expected and accomplished their mission, but it is clear that 2nd generation devices are needed to match the capabilities of both the main gun and fire control system as regards engagement ranges.
Predictably enough sand storms made target acquisition difficult.
Automotive Issues
Given the extreme dusty conditions, air filters for both the engine and the air conditioning system required continuous cleaning and servicing by the crews. It is suspected that this situation contributed to an higher than expected rate of engine failure. [Very much the same problems were experienced during Operation "Desert Storm", but it would appear that no significant improvements could be introduced during the past twelve years - Ed.].
ABRAMS tanks also suffered from a high rate of suspension failures on the 2nd, 3rd and 5th left and right road arms and assemblies. The reasons for these failures and possible corrective measures are being investigated by the Army's ABRAMS Programme Management office and GDIS engineers. Also, the wear on both road wheels and tracks proved to be significant over long distances and high rates of speed.
More significantly, the rate of movement and maneuvering over vast distances in a short period of time caused armoured units to use more fuel than projected, which ended up taxing the logistics system. The prevailing combat conditions placed a high demand on turret power, and required continuous scanning of the surrounding terrain. As a result, there is a mixed feedback on the use and value of the External Auxiliary Power Unit.
Logistics & Sustainment Aspects
Units that deployed with sound ASLs (Allowable Supply Lists) and PLLs (Parts Load Lists) fared best, which indeed is hardly surprising.
The operational tempo of the campaign did not facilitate pushing Class IX (i.e. repair) parts forward until Baghdad was secured, although in some instances, critical end-items were airlifted forward when weather permitted. As a result of this situation, it was necessary to adopt a practice whereby if a unit did not have a required part on hand to repair a damaged or immobilised vehicle, then the vehicle was stripped of all usable components and the hulk left were it sat.
All division level units consistently suffered from the inability to send SARRS (Standard Army Retail Supply System) data, resulting in poor or no visibility on requisition status. Generally SARRS as such worked fine, but the communication links failed due to a variety of issues (could not get through "fire walls", software and driver problems, internet routing protocols). Satellite-based communications proved to be the most reliable form of communications.
TAP was originally placed at the theatre logistics hub in Arifjan, and was subsequently moved to the Balad airfield north of Baghdad. LRUs/SRUs (Line/Shop Replaceable Units) that could not be fixed by TAP were flown back from Balad to Arifjan from where they were sent back to Ft. Hood for repair. Minimum turn-around time for replacement LRUs/ SRUs to arrive back in country was 30 days.
Summary
The ABRAMS tank performed extremely well providing excellent maneuver, firepower, and overall crew protection. Engines typically outlived expectancies, and transmissions proved to be durable. Specific areas for improvement include:
- Side and rear armour protection
- Wartime ASL/PLL authorisation
- Stowage plans
- Suspension durability.
PHOTOUSTop: A column of M1A1 tanks from Charlie Company, 1st Tank Battalion USMC in action near Safwan Hill on 21st March. By the time of this writing, the USMC has not yet released any official "Lesson Learned" document about the use of its ABRAMS during the conflict.
(Photo: USMC / Sgt. Paul L. Anstine II)
Below: The hulk of a burned out ABRAMS (cause not specified). As in all other cases, the crew was able to make it out.
The silhouette of an ABRAMS tank during the 400km march to Baghdad
along "Road Ottawa".
(All photos: US Army unless otherwise stated)
The entry hole of a RPG-7 shaped charge jet on the left side non-ballistic skirts of an M1A1. The jet penetrated into the hydraulic reservoir.
Sheer bad luck. This ABRAMS received several hits of 12.7x108 ammunition from an old DSh heavy machine gun to the left sponson box, which of course achieved no hull penetration but initiated a fire in the external auxiliary power unit (EAPU). The fire then propagated to the engine compartment, resulting in a mobility kill. The immobilised tank was subsequently stripped of parts by US forces.
A BRADLEY on the move in the desert. Notice the backpacks, sleeping bags and other bulky items hanging over the sides. This was both to gain space inside the vehicle, and to provide additional protection against RPG-7 attacks. (Photo: United Defense)
During a close-range fighting at An Najif on 26 March, this ABRAMS received multiple small arms rounds on the turret left side (cosmetic damage), two RPG warheads on the turret left side (one warhead glanced off, the other penetrated by no more than some 3cm), and eight friendly fire 25mm AP DU rounds. Three rounds hit the turret right side with no major damage, but the other five penetrated the rear engine grill and disabled the tank with a mobility kill.
Two Iraqi T-72s destroyed by US tank fire.
A direct hit by what appears to be a KE round on the turret of an ABRAMS. Judging from the photo, no penetration was achieved beyond a shallow crater. The outer panel which petaled out is an IR-reflective material to facilitate identification through thermal imaging sights, and has nothing to do with armour.
The new special aft shield developed by the Army Research Lab in a crash programme.
The result of one round of ammunition in the turret bustle of an M1A1 being ignited. Although the propellant charge burned out, there was no warhead detonation.
This ABRAMS was being towed back to the maintenance area because on an engine fire, but the decision was then taken to destroy it in order to prevent any risk of the vehicle falling in enemy hands. It took a termite charge in the crew compartment, an APFSDS round in the turret and two MAVERICKs to do the job.
"Тот, кто надевает шоры, должен помнить, что в комплект еще входят узда и кнут" (Станислав Ежи Лец)