Да, про бетон я переборщил. Запамятовал. Это был деревянный столб. Но и это тоже не мало. От столкновений с птицами падали. Вот кстати этот отрывок:
«Хотя мало кто из летчиков и техников испытывал особую симпатию к МиГ-23М, один случай заставил всех в полку сильно зауважать его за прочность. Основным стартом на аэродроме Цербст был взлет с курсом на запад (порядка 250 градусов) в сторону города. Применительно к нему все посадочные системы и освещение были хорошо отлажены и хлопот экипажам не доставляли. Всего раза два в год ветер менялся на сильный восточный, и батальону аэродромно-технического обеспечения приходилось переставлять прожектора на автомобильном шасси к противоположному краю полосы. Как-то зимой ветер резко переменился в самый разгар ночной смены, когда в воздухе находилось несколько самолетов, в том числе и капитана Агеева, уже завершившего выполнение полетного задания. Он первым зашел на посадку с курсом 70, сел, бодро зарулил на ЦЗ, отметил в журнале техника самолета «Замечаний нет», расписался и побежал в домик доигрывать ответственный турнир эскадрильи по домино. Вскоре в будке старшего инженера полетов распахнулась дверь, в проеме возникли печальные фигуры инженера эскадрильи и техника самолета, крепко прижимающего к груди свой журнал. На вопрос, что случилось, инженер ничего не ответил, а только выдохнул: «Пойдем». На стоянке техсостав с изумлением рассматривал капитально развороченную правую поворотную часть крыла, в рваной сквозной дыре плотно сидел полутораметровый обломок деревянного телеграфного столба с фарфоровыми изоляторами, шасси и хвостовая часть самолета были опутаны обрывками стального провода, и кое-где на обшивке виднелись следы электрических разрядов. И как после этого быть с записью в журнале? Происхождение столба выяснилось быстро: с ближнего привода уже позвонили на КДП, что какой-то самолет снес им антенны, и потому дальше обеспечивать полеты становится невозможно. Причиной аварии оказались неточно установленные в темноте и спешке прожектора, из-за чего Агеев визуально зашел на посадку ниже глиссады. Интересно, что на сильный удар о столб ни летчик, ни самолет никак не отреагировали. В общем, на заводе в Москве заказали новую поворотную часть крыла, несколько месяцев возились в ТЭЧ с ее установкой, и самолет потом летал.»
К сожаплению нет времени и я уезжаю на 10 дней. помогите с переводом.
There are some problems that they [MiG-29 pilots] have to contend with. One such problem is that the MiG’s display of radar contacts is not anything like ours [in F-16]. They don’t get anywhere as much situational awareness, even though they have a fairly good detection capability. The radar is powerful and flexible, but they lack the on-board processing to give the pilot a decent, clear picture with the threats analyzed and prioritized, stuff we take for granted. The pilot has a very hard time knowing who he has locked onto and what the situation is. So we not only enjoy a significant advantage with our long-range Amraam missile, but we also possess a crucial advantage in situational awareness. This means that we could quite often get somebody into the fight unseen, just because their system would not permit them to see the whole engagement. That is the key reason why they are so reliant on GCI or AWACS control. The firing procedure in the MiG-29 is much more labor-intensive than it is in the F-16. If we shoot a BVR missile we get everything we need in the HUD. We can have a line showing our radar scan limits, telling us how far we can turn away and still provide the missile with guidance. The computer works out the time the missile will be in flight, and a countdown clock automatically winds down in the HUD so that we know when we can break away completely. We don’t have to think about it. He doesn’t have that. A huge clock dominates the cockpit panel. When he fires a BVR missile he has to work out the missile’s flight time himself in order to illuminate the target long enough. This is hardly high-tech stuff. That same basic clock came out of the MiG-23, and before out of the MiG-21. It is an old-fashioned mechanical wind-up clock.
An important innovation was the radar projection into the HUD which showed a target and informed the pilot if the target was within the missile range. It was introduced in late MiG-23s and it represented a large improvement over what the MiG drivers had before. But it still gave the pilot much less infor-mation for situational awareness than the latest Western avionics did. When the Israelis got their hands on a very late MiG-23 they were very impressed by the ability to do that – and you have to respect what the Israelis think about fighter planes! But as an F-16 pilot, I personally think it is a waste. They are not gi-ving the pilot in their HUD any news for situational awareness. They put the ra-dar projection into the HUD, but the pilot cannot really tell the position in space of what he has locked onto. The image is flat rather than three-dimensional. It is like a transparent map in front of the HUD and it does not show in what part of the sky a target is. To learn the true location of the target, the pilot has to look to the scale on the left side. In addition, the radar scan can be centered straight ahead or at 30 degrees sideway. The pilot would be flying straight ahead and see a target straight ahead but the radar might be looking 30 degrees to the right or left. This may mislead the pilot about the true location of the target. So he must remember or check where he had set the switch. That is just too much math to do in the cockpit. Even flying straight and level it is not easy, but pulling Gs in maneuvers with time factor critical it becomes a serious handicap. In the F-16 we can’t see a radar picture in the HUD, but if we get a radar lock, we see a boresight cross on the top of the HUD [with a locator line showing at what angle to our path the target is.] And the HUD gives us updated information of speed, altitude, heading and weapons status. So we have the position of a locked-up tar-get in space, and that is much more useful.
Three pilots from the 510th received backseat rides in one of the JG-73's two-seat MiG-29 trainers. Capt. Sparrow was one of them. "The MiG is harder to fly than the F-16," said Sparrow. "The Soviet airframe is great, but the avionics are not user friendly. After flying in the backseat of the Fulcrum, I got a feel for how spoiled we are in the F-16. I always felt good about the F-16, but I wouldn't trade flying the F-16 for any other aircraft, foreign or domestic.
"The Fulcrum doesn't have the crisp movements of an F-16," Sparrow continued. "You need to be an octopus in the MiG-29 to work the avionics. Those German pilots have it tough. Just to get a simple lock on and fire a missile may take a half dozen hands-off switches or so. We can do the same with a flick of the thumb while we are looking at the HUD. F-16 pilots also have a significant sight advantage. A couple of hundred feet advantage can make a difference in air-to-air combat; the actual difference is more significant than that. MiG-29 pilots have a tough time checking their six o'clock. Their canopy rail is higher. They can lose sight of us even when flying BFM."
"Their visibility is not that good," agreed McCoy, one of the other two pilots who enjoyed a spin in the Fulcrum. "Their disadvantage is a real advantage for us. F-16 pilots sit high in the cockpit. All the MiG-29 pilots who sat in our cockpit wanted to look around with the canopy closed. They were impressed that they could turn around and look at the tail and even see the engine can."
"Besides visibility, I expected better turning performance," McCoy continued. "The MiG-29 is not a continuous nine-g machine like the F-16. I tried to do some things I normally do in an F-16. For example, I tried a high-AOA guns jink. I got the Fulcrum down to about 180 knots and pulled ninety degrees of bank and started pulling heavy g's. I then went to idle and added a little rudder to get the jet to roll with ailerons. The pilot took control away from me in the middle of these maneuvers because the airplane was about to snap. I use the F-16's quick roll rate like this all the time with no problem.
"I also tried to do a 250-knot loop," McCoy recalled. "I went to mil power and stabilized. As I went nose high, I asked for afterburner. I had to hamfist the airplane a little as I approached the top of the loop. I was still in afterburner at about 15,000 feet and the jet lost control. The nose started slicing left and right. I let go of the stick and the airplane righted itself and went down. It couldn't finish the loop. In the F-16, we can complete an entire loop at 250 knots."
Like Sparrow, McCoy climbed out of the MiG-29 cockpit feeling better about the F-16, especially its automation. "The biggest instrument in the MiG-29 cockpit is the clock," McCoy said. "It took me a while to understand this. But a large clock is needed to keep track of the time after launching a missile. When they launch a missile, they have to consider their shot range and the type of missile they are shooting and estimate how long it will take to impact before firing. When they take a five-mile Alamo shot, for example, they have to calculate mentally the time required for the missile to reach its target so their radar can illuminate it for the duration. They fire and watch until they know when they can turn away. That procedure is a real disadvantage if they're flying against someone who shot a missile at them at about the same time.
"F-16 pilots don't have to think about these things," McCoy continued. "We have great automation. When we launch a missile, the airplane performs all the calculations and displays a countdown on the head-up display for us. When we're within ten miles, we want our eyes out of the cockpit looking for flashes or smoke from an adversary. That's why our head-up display is focused to infinity. We can view information without refocusing our eyes to scan the horizon. Inside of ten miles, Fulcrum pilots are moving their hands around flipping about six switches, some they have to look at. I am moving one, maybe two switches, without taking my hands off the throttle and stick."
German Fulcrum pilots realize the limitations, and advantages, of their aircraft. "If you define an F-16 as a third-generation fighter, it is not fair to speak of the MiG-29 as a third-generation aircraft because of its avionics," said Lt. Col. Manfred Skeries, the deputy commander of the JG-73. "Aerodynamics, now, are something different." Skeries is the former commander of all East German fighter forces and the first German pilot to fly the MiG-29. His comments came after he received his first flight in the F-16.
"The MiG-29's avionics are a shortcoming," admitted Capt. Michael Raubbach, a Fulcrum pilot of the JG 73. "Its radar-warning and navigational equipment are not up to Western standards. The Russian idea of hands-on throttle and stick is not the same as it is in the West. It is true that we have to look in the cockpit a lot to flip switches. And the way information is provided and the accuracy with which it is provided-in the navigational equipment in particular-doesn't allow full employment in the Western concept.
"Our visibility is not as good as an F-16 or even an F-15," Raubbach continued. "We can't see directly behind us. We have to look out the side slightly to see behind us, which doesn't allow us to maintain a visual contact and an optimum lift vector at the same time. This shortcoming can be a real problem, especially when flying against an aircraft as small as the F-16. But as a German, I can't complain about the MiG's visibility. The aircraft offers the greatest visibility in our air force."